Catherine Wong, Doctoral Candidate, School of Sociology, The Australian National University.

Larry Saha Seminar Room 2175, Level 2, Haydon-Allen Building, The Australian National University

Research on social organisation and risk have shown that the bounded nature of organisational rationality sometimes compels them to act in ways that may otherwise appear to be against their best interest. Why then are organisations still perceived as the bastions of rationality and scientific professionalism, endowed with the power to define acceptable risk on behalf of society?

This paper will argue that the reason lies in the way organisations assemble risk and resist contestations. The majority of existing literature on organisations in this field focuses on risk-benefit analysis, risk management, and the social construction of risk. But these studies spring from either the positivist assumption that risk is a “truth” that can be defined, measured and managed, or the constructionist position that risk is mediated by social beliefs, values, norms and power structures. Although in contention with each other, both theoretical approaches share the underlying believe in human exceptionality. This paper by contrast, uses an Actor-Network Theory (ANT) approach to argue that risk is neither a “truth” that humans can discover, nor a “construct” that only humans create. Risk is instead conceptualised as a network of relations made up of both human and non-human actors that give the system ideational and material stability, despite internal flaws and contradictions. One could also argue, as Renn does, for a recursive approach whereby the responses to risk feed back into the objective probability of harm. The ANT approach however, extends this by including non-human responses, and tracing the changes in actors as they respond to feedbacks. By reframing the analysis from a focus on “organisational risk” to “the organisation of risk”, there is greater scope for identifying contradictions within the system and spaces for change.

Drawing on qualitative data from interviews conducted with key nuclear power organisations in India, the analysis shows that the growth imperative, nuclear exceptionality, technological nationalism, and socio-technical systems form the core of this particular risk network. These actors reinforce the sense of safety and faith in technology. They also amplify the risk of climate change and economic crisis, while attenuating the risks of disproportionate costs, scientific uncertainties, and environmental limitations. The law, science, and State power are applied to resist contestations and accord legitimacy to the risk network. But they are also used against the organisations to raise questions of trust and transparency, which in the process, creates self-doubt within the organisation. These organisations therefore, may maintain an external façade of stability, but in fact be experiencing internal dissonance, which could open new spaces for change.